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TRANSACTION COSTS OF RURAL BANK BRANCHES IN BANGLADESH 
ABSTRACT 
A system of cost equations is estimated for rural bank branches in 
Bangladesh in order to evaluate the overall costs of financial 
intermediation and related cost concepts. Costs of intermediation are well 
above authorized spreads. The average bank branch displayed constant returns 
to scale. 

TRANSACTION COSTS OF RURAL BANK BRANCHES IN BANGLADESH 
Introduction 
The literature on rural finance in developing countries has been 
dominated during the past couple of decades by a preoccupation with 
extending loans to farmers. Relatively little attention has been given to 
the costs of financial intermediation and to bank efficiency. Any concern 
shown for efficiency has focused only on financial costs. It has been 
assumed that the nonfinancial costs were negligible. Recent research in 
Honduras, Jamaica, and the Philippines appears to challenge this assumption 
(e.g., Cuevas, Lamberte, Nyanin). These studies suggest that resource costs 
of financial intermediation are significant, and the viability of many 
institutions may be threatened if these costs are not covered. 
There is little evidence of concern in Bangladesh, for costs and 
efficiency in banking. Studies by the World Bank in the early 1980s 
speculated on the magnitude of administrative costs. One study estimated 
that 63 percent of the rural bank branches in Bangladesh were non-viable 
i.e., the banks were unable to recover the minimum administrative costs of 
operating a typical rural bank branch. 
Further, in Bangladesh, as in numerous other low-income countries, 
financial policies have been actively used as instruments for economic 
development. The set of policies include ceilings on interest rates, branch 
and bank licensing restrictions, and credit-allocation policies. Benston and 
Smith, in their study of the impacts of regulation on costs of U.S. banks, 
conclude that "government regulation increases the transactions costs of 
financial intermediation principally by restricting financial intermediaries 
from operating as efficiently as they otherwise would" (p.228). Since 
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regulatory policies in low-income countries are more pervasive, it is 
expected that similar conclusions hold. Cuevas' study found strong evidence 
of the cost-increasing effect of regulation in Honduras. 
This paper attempts to measure the cost-output relationship and 
production technology of a major nationalized commercial bank in the 
regulatory environment prevalent in Bangladesh. The financial system is 
viewed as a service sector, and the role of transaction costs in the 
provision of financial services is emphasized. More specifically, the 
effects of branching policies on the size and product-mix of bank branches 
will be examined. The remainder of this paper describes the model, data, and 
empirical results. The paper concludes with a brief summary of the major 
findings. 
I. The Model 
Nationalized bank branches are assumed to minimize the costs associated 
with a given level of output. Solving the bank's cost minimization problem 
yields the cost function, 
c F(Q, P) (1) 
where Q(=q1 , ..... ,qm) is an m-dimensional vector of bank output levels, and 
P(=p1 , .... ,pn) is an n-dimensional vector of input prices (Varian). Bank 
branches are assumed to treat input prices and outpu~ quantities as 
exogenous elements in the decision process. 
The functional form, F, was assumed to be of the translog variety. The 
advantages are that the translog is a flexible functional form, and is well-
suited to the analysis of the cost properties of multiproduct firms such as 
economies of scale and scope (Caves and Christensen). The translog function 
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is quadratic in the logarithm of output quantities and input prices, and 
linear in the parameters. The general form can be written as follows, 
n m m 
ln C a. 1. ln qi +I ~. ln p. + 1/2 I I ~ik ln qi ln qk j=l J J i=l k=l 
n n m n 
+ 1/2 I I >... ln pj ln P + I I B • • ln qi ln pj (2) JS s i=l 1.J j=l s=l j=l 
where, qi is the quantity of the ith output, pj is the price of the jth 
input, and ln denotes natural logarithm. Neo-classical theory suggests that 
(2) is linearly homogenous in all input prices, concave in pj' and 
increasing in q. and p. (Varian). It is possible to derive a system of cost-
1. J 
share equations directly from the translog cost function by differentiating 
(2) with respect to p., 
J 
M. 
J 
or M. 
J 
a ln c 
a ln pj 
n m 
~· + I >... ln p + I BiJ" ln qi 
J s=l JS S i=l 
where M. is the cost share of the jth input (Shephard's lemma). Symmetry 
J 
(3) 
conditions and linear homogeneity restrictions are imposed for estimation. 
The latter are exactly the same parametric restrictions imposed by the 
requirement that the sum of the cost shares (3) must equal one (Caves, 
Christensen, and Tretheway). 
Along the lines of earlier cost studies, several economically important 
properties can be derived from the cost function (2). These properties are 
summarized below (Benston et al., Gilligan et al., Murray and White). 
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Economies of Scale 
The overall economies of scale realized in the general case when all 
outputs are increased by a common factor, 5, is obtained by differentiating 
(2) with respect to all qi, 
or 
m 
s I a ln c 
i=l a ln qi 
m m m m n 
s I a. +I I ~ik ln qk +I I & . . ln pJ. 
i=l i i=l k=l i=l j=l lJ 
It is evident from (4) that overall scale economies are a function of 
(4) 
differences in output mix as well as differences in factor prices. If S is 
less than one, there are economies of scale, since costs increase 
proportionately less than output. Values of S equal to or greater than one 
correspond to constant returns or diseconomies, respectively. 
In addition, the translog form also permits evaluation of the effects 
of variations in the output of one product, holding constant the quantities 
of other products. Product-specific economies of scale, S., are defined as 
i 
the marginal cost of producing a particular product divided by the average 
incremental cost of its production, 
a c / a q. 
i 
(C (Q) - C (Q .))/q. 
-i i 
(5) 
where, Q . is the output vector with a zero replacing the quantity of the 
-i 
ith output. If S. is less than one, then product-specific scale economies 
i 
exist. 
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Interproduct Cost Complementarities 
Economies of scope exist if the bank can produce a group of products in 
combination more cheaply than it can produce the same group of products 
individually (Panzar and Willig). Interproduct cost complementarities is a 
weaker concept and exists if the marginal cost of producing one product 
declines with increases in production of another product. Cost 
complementarities exist between qi and qk if, 
a2 c < 0 (6) 
An approximate condition for cost complementarity, suggested by Murray and 
White, in terms of the parameters of the translog cost function is, 
(7) 
II. The Data 
The estimation of the cost function reported in this paper used semi-
annual income-expense statements obtained for a period of two years (1983 
and 1984) from 40 branches of Agrani Bank, one of the largest commercial 
banks in Bangladesh. All of the sample branches are located in rural areas. 
Quarterly data on number and amount of loans and deposits were obtained from 
the central bank of the country. All variables have been expressed in real 
terms (takas of 1973/74) using the rural consumer price index. Variable 
definitions are briefly outlined below: 
(a) Total costs, C, include all operating/administrative expenses net of 
depreciation and bad debt reserves. 
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(b) Following Cuevas, two alternative definitions of bank output were used: 
(i) the number of loan and deposit accounts (as separate outputs), and (ii) 
the value of deposit and loan balances outstanding. 
(c) Two input categories have been defined: labor and capital. The unit 
cost of labor is defined as total personnel costs including benefits divided 
by the total number of employees. The unit price of capital was obtained by 
summing the major capital expenses such as rent and depreciation, and 
dividing by the value of deposit and loan balances outstanding at the end of 
the period. 
(d) Loan and deposit sizes were included in the model to account for the 
heterogeneity of loan and deposit transactions. They are included in the 
cost function (2) in interactive form with the output levels. In this way, 
the cost concepts become dependent on the average size of loans and 
deposits. 
Since the sum of the cost shares by definition must equal unity, one of 
the equations in (3) is redundant and, therefore, is dropped from the 
system. Fortunately, maximum likelihood estimates should be invariant to the 
equation excluded (Johnston). The estimating form of the model consists of 
equation (2) and the labor-share equation. An iterative Zellner procedure is 
used on the cost system, allowing for nonzero correlations in the off-
diagonal elements of the disturbance covariance matrix. 
III. Results 
Parameter estimates are reported in Table 1 for the cost system using 
2 both definitions of output. The system R was .53 (model 1) and .33 (model 
2). Most of the estimates are statistically significant and carry the 
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expected signs, despite the large number of variables included in the 
regression. There is statistical support for a cost function that is regular 
and the factor-price homogeneity restrictions were significant in both 
models. The size variables exerted a positive influence on costs in model 1 
and a negative influence in model 2. This difference will be discussed 
below. The residuals were tested for normality, homoscedasticity, and 
independence. The null hypotheses could not be rejected in all cases. 
The results in Table 2 apply to an average bank branch which produces 
the geometric mean output vector, and pays the geometric mean prices for 
factors of production. This is the point of local approximation. Rows 1 and 
2 of Table 2 indicate the distribution of total intermediation costs in the 
bank between lending costs and costs of.deposit mobilization. 1 Rows 3 
through 8 show the average and marginal costs of lending and deposit-
2 
mobilization, and overall intermediation costs on a per taka and per 
account basis. Over 60 percent of the bank's costs of intermediation 
correspond to deposit mobilization activities, whereas only 29-34 percent of 
its costs are attributed to lending. This finding appears to reflect a 
greater reliance of the branches on deposits mobilized from various sources 
rather than intra-bank borrowing. However, the underlying pattern in the 
composition of the bank's liabilities is not completely reflected in the 
participation of lending and deposit mobilization activities in total 
intermediation costs. This issue is discussed in greater length below. 
1. The exercise in cost allocation between outputs follows the analysis of 
Laitinen. 
2. Taka is a unit of Bangladesh currency, where Tk.25 z $1.00 during the 
study period. Figures in takas are takas of 1973/74. 
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Table 1. Agrani Bank: Estimated Parameters of the Cost Function. System 
Estimation with Two Output Definitions£/ 
Model (Output Definition) 
(1) 
Value of Deposits and 
Loan Balances 
Parameter (Variable)Q/ Estimate t-ratio 
(asymptotic) 
a 0 (Intercept) 
a 1 (ln q1 ) 
a2 (ln q2) 
f31 (ln pl) 
f32 (ln P2) 
2 
,.ll (ln ql) 
2 
1'22 (ln q2) 
,.12 (ln q1ln q2) 
2 
.All (ln pl) 
2 
>..22 (ln P2) 
>..12 (ln plln P2) 
Bll (ln ql ln p1 ) 
e12 (ln q1ln p 2) 
e21 (ln q2ln p1 ) 
e22 (ln q2ln p 2) 
,,1 (ln q1ln DS) 
,., 2 (ln q2ln LS) 
R2 
1. 830 
0.0250 
0. 7174 
0.5961 
0.4039 
0.2599 
0.0620 
-O.ll72 
0. Oll9 
0. Oll9 
-0.0ll9 
-0.0402 
0.0402 
-0.0040 
0.0040 
-0.0057 
-O.Oll2 
0.53 
1.251 
0.077 
4.852* 
* 5.440 
3.687* 
* 5.754 
4.377* 
-5.615* 
0.789 
0.789 
-0.789 
-3.153* 
3.153* 
-0.431 
0.431 
-0.463 
-2 .172** 
(2) 
Number of Deposit 
and Loan Accounts 
Estimate t-ratio 
(asymptotic) 
2.3244 
0. 3871 
0.3865 
0.4580 
0.5420 
O.ll23 
0.1035 
-0.0704 
0.0219 
0.0219 
-0.0219 
-0.0188 
0.0188 
-0.0183 
0.0183 
0.0590 
0. 0377 
0.33 
1.215 
0.884 
1. 973 ** 
3.246* 
3.841* 
1.628 
* 5.036 
-2.574** 
1. 721 t 
1. 721 t 
-l.72lt 
-1. 016 
1.016 
-2.436** 
** 2.436 
* 5.897 
4.814* 
£! Factor-price homogeneity and cross-equation restrictions imposed on 
estimation. N=l60. Levels of significance: *=0.01; **=0.05; t=0.10. 
Q/ Variable definitions are: q1 is deposits; q2 , loans; p1 , price of labor; 
p2 , price of capital; DS, deposit-size; LS, loan-size. 
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Table 2. Lender's Intermediation Costs: Lending Costs and Related 
Cost Concepts. Summary of Findings for Agrani Bank with Two Output 
Definitions. 
Cost Concept 
1. Share of Deposit-
Mobilization Costs 
in Total Inter-
mediation Costs 
2. Share of Lending 
Costs in Total 
Intermediation Costs 
Costs of Lending 
3. Average Costs 
4. Marginal Costs 
Model (Output 
(1) 
Value of Deposit 
and Loan Balances 
70.6% 
29.4% 
2.88% 
0.80% 
Costs of Mobilizing Deposits 
5. Average Costs 
6. Marginal Costs 
Overall Intermediation 
Costs 
7. Average Costs 
8. Marginal Costs 
9. Economies of scale (S) 
F-test for H0 : s = 1 
4.22% 
2.80% 
7.10% 
3.60% 
0.94 
( 1. 35) 
Partial Economies of Scale (Si) 
10. s1 , Deposits 
11. s2 , Loans 
12. Cost Complementarities 
F-test for H0 :~12+a1a2=0 
0.66 
0.28 
-0.099 
(0.19) 
Definition) 
(2) 
Number of Loan and 
Deposit Accounts 
65.7% 
34.3% 
4.80% 
1.48% 
1. 86% 
1.10% 
6.66% 
2.58% 
0.90 
(1.82) 
0.59 
0.31 
0.079 
(0.19) 
Source: Results of cost-system estimations, Table l, evaluated at the 
geometric means of the variables in the models. 
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Although the overall costs of financial intermediation are not 
significantly different in the two models, costs of lending and deposit 
mobilization show a contrast in the two output definitions. The estimated 
average cost per loan is more than twice as high as the average cost per 
deposit account (model 2). However, the average size of loan made by the 
bank was almost 3 times that of the average deposit size during the sample 
period. In part, this helps explain the difference in average costs per taka 
lent and mobilized as deposits (model 1). 
It is important to note that the cost estimates reported in Table 2 do 
not include provisions for bad debt; thus they represent a lower bound for 
the operational spread required, assuming 100 percent loan repayment. A 
financial analysis of the sample branches (Srinivasan and Meyer) revealed 
that average interest spreads were of the order of 3 percent, well below the 
overall intermediation costs reported in Table 2. Note also that average 
costs are greater than marginal costs in all cases, implying that the 
branches are located on the downward sloping segment of a U-shaped cost 
curve. This result will become clearer when the scale economy measures are 
analyzed. 
The point estimate of overall economies of scale is close to one in 
both models, indicating constant returns to scale. A 10 percent increase in 
the production of both outputs in value terms (using the accounts 
definition) will generate a 9.4 (9.0) percent increase in total 
administrative costs. As is evident from table 2, there exist substantial 
differences in the separate cost-effects of the expansion of individual 
outputs. Although there are increasing returns to both lending and deposit 
mobilization (rows 10 and 11), economies of scale are relatively more 
pronounced in the former. The partial scale economies measure of 0.28 (0.31) 
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indicates that a 10 percent increase in lending generates only a 2.8 (3.1) 
percent increase in administrative costs. On the other hand, a 10 percent 
increase in deposits mobilized would create a cost increase of 6.6 (5.9) 
percent. Thus expansion of this bank's loans is the activity that shows cost 
advantages as compared to deposit mobilization 
There are several important qualifications to the conclusion that the 
branches could benefit from economies of scale by expanding their loans 
relatively more than their deposits. First, lending activities are defined 
here to include all outstanding loans. The latter contain principal amounts 
that have not yet been repaid and various interest amounts which have been 
capitalized. Second, increases in lending across the branches were not 
accompanied by proportional movements in deposit mobilization and branches 
with large loan portfolios did not carry large deposit portfolios. Further, 
analysis of the intra-bank flow of funds revealed that borrowing from the 
head office was strongly correlated with the lending activities of the 
branches, while deposit mobilization was highly correlated with lending to 
the head office. These findings imply that on the one hand, lending was 
expanded across branches following targeted lending programs. On the other 
hand, rates of interest on intra-bank borrowing and lending were set at 
levels that made it profitable for the branches to invest their deposits 
with the head office rather than to make agricultural loans. 
The results appear to be consistent with the stated objectives of 
banking policy to increase the flow of savings intermediated in the system, 
and to increase the proportion of loans made to target groups, especially 
agriculture. Licensing policy was geared to meeting these objectives, and 
resulted in the proliferation of numerous, small bank branches in the rural 
areas after 1977 (World Bank). The results suggest that this bank's response 
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to licensing policy led to the exhaustion of scale economies in the average 
bank branch. 
An important source of cost complementarities in banking is that 
conducting credit analyses of loan applicants who have deposit accounts is 
(or should be) less costly than non-depositor credit analyses. The necessary 
condition for cost complementarity suggested by Murray and White is met in 
model 1, though it is not statistically significant. This result is not 
unexpected since there appears to be relatively little loan screening 
conducted by bank branches in Bangladesh (Smith). Typically, branch 
officials are not originally from the areas in which they work, but are 
transferred every two to three years; as such, they may not be very familiar 
with the local villagers. During the period under review, the marketing of 
loans, identification of borrowers, and even loan disbursements were 
commonly handled by non-bank personnel (Union Credit Committees) under the 
government's special lending programs (which represent a significant portion 
of these branches portfolios). Thus there was limited use of information by 
different departments of the bank in extending different services to the 
same client. 
IV. Concluding Comments 
This study has estimated the costs involved in financial intermediation 
for a nationalized commercial bank in Bangladesh. Regulatory policy has 
traditionally focused on the financial costs incurred by banks. The results 
reported in this paper suggest that nonfinancial costs may be just as, if 
not more, important. Although regulation-related variables were not 
explicitly introduced into the cost function, the overall scale economy 
measure suggests that the bank's response to licensing policy resulted in 
13 
the exhaustion of scale economies of the "average" bank branch in the 
system. On the other hand, product-specific scale economy measures suggest 
possible lines for further expansion. 
Financial intermediation costs incurred by the average branch appear to 
be large relative to the spreads authorized between interest income and 
interest expense. In other words, every time the branch makes a loan and 
opens a deposit account it is incurring a loss. Furthermore, it must be 
emphasized that the costs of default were not incorporated into the 
analysis. There is reason to believe that future loan losses incurred by the 
rural branches of the nationalized banks in Bangladesh may be significant 
(Cookson, Gregory and Adams). It is highly probable that the spreads will 
turn even more negative when the margins are appropriately adjusted for 
estimated costs of default. Therefore the bank may be justified in not 
adjusting to the partial scale economies that appear to exist for rural 
lending. If Bangladesh is to succeed in its policy of rural lending without 
committing scarce resources to subsidizing rural bank branches, it must 
simultaneously deal with two problems, namely, the minimum spread required 
for the bank to cover intermediation costs and how to improve the conditions 
for better loan recovery. 
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